The Persuasive Effects of Quantification in Managerial Judgment

Kathryn Kadous
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign

Lisa Koonce
The University of Texas at Austin

Kristy L. Towry
Emory University

Abstract: Managers proposing new projects or changes in firm operating policy must decide how to present their proposals so as to maximize the likelihood of approval. Conventional wisdom holds that putting numbers to the proposal, or quantifying it, enhances its persuasive power; however, we demonstrate that quantifying a proposal does not always increase persuasiveness, even when the quantification is of high quality. In this paper, we develop and test a process-based model of how quantification influences persuasion. We posit that quantifying a proposal enhances its persuasive power by increasing both the perceived competence of the proposal preparer and the perceived plausibility that a favorable outcome could occur. However, quantification also invites scrutiny of the details of the proposal, which potentially offsets these effects. In two experiments, we investigate conditions that are more and less likely to result in critical analysis of the details of the quantified proposal. We find that the nature of the inputs to the analysis (whether subjective or objective) and the incentives of the preparer (whether consistent with the firm’s interests or inconsistent) moderate the influence of quantification on persuasion. Moreover, path analysis results support most aspects of the model in both experiments. Our model should prove of value to researchers interested in the effects of measurement and quantification on decisions. Further, our results should be of interest to managers who prepare proposals, as well as to those who evaluate them.

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