Stan Davis
Wake Forest University
Todd DeZoort
The University of Alabama
Lori Kopp
University of Lethbridge
Abstract: This study evaluates the extent that management accounting professionals are susceptible to inappropriate obedience pressure to violate corporate policy and add slack to an initial budget recommendation. We also examine the underlying ethical dimensions of the pressure-based decision and the effects of obedience pressure source and organizational structure. The results of an experiment with 77 management accountants reveal that almost half of the participants responded to the obedience pressure and created budgetary slack in violation of explicit corporate policy. The results also extend the obedience pressure literature in accounting by revealing that participants who added slack to their initial budget recommendation found themselves less responsible for their budget decision than did participants who refused to add slack. In addition, a majority of the participants indicated that the creation of budgetary slack was unfair, unjust, and/or contrary to their duties. The pressure effects were consistent across pressure source and organizational structure.
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