Jong - Hag Choi Jeong - Bon Kim Yoonseok Zang Abstract: This paper examines whether, and how, audit quality proxied by unsigned discretionary accruals is associated with abnormal audit fees, i.e., actual audit fees in excess of expected, normal audit fees. The results of various regressions reveal that the association between the two is insignificant for the full sample, significantly positive for the subsample of clients with positive abnormal fees, and insignificantly negative for the subsample of clients with negative abnormal fees. The above results suggest that auditors’ incentives to compromise audit quality differ systematically for more profitable clients (with positive abnormal fees) vis-a-vis less profitable clients (with negative abnormal fees), which in turn leads to the audit fee-audit quality association being conditioned on the sign of abnormal audit fees. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks. Relevant implications to policy makers and academic researchers are discussed. |