2006 Annual Meetng

An International Meeting of
the American Accounting Association

American Accounting Association
2006 Annual Meeting

August 6–9, 2006
Washington, D.C.


Does the Political Economy Affect Auditor Incentives? Some Chinese Evidence on Non-Big 4 Audit Quality

Ferdinand A. Gul
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Jeong - Bon Kim
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Aini Qiu
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Abstract: We investigate whether and how auditor location, a proxy for political connections between local governments and auditors, and the importance of a client relative to an auditor’s client portfolio affects the quality of audits by non-Big 4 auditors in China’s guanxi-based economy. We find that clients of local auditors report a higher level of abnormal non-core earnings and receive modified audit opinions less frequently, compared with clients of non-local auditors. The finding is consistent with the notion that local auditors are more likely to be politically influenced by the local government, and thus provide lower-quality audits than non-local auditors. We also find that in sharp contrast with the U.S. evidence of Big 4 clients, in China, auditors are more economic dependent on important clients than non-local auditors do. Our study provides insights into the role of political economy in affecting financial reporting behavior by using within-country, firm-specific data.

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