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Managerial Budgeting Games and Attitudes under Budgetary Pressures
Cheng - Li Huang,
Tamkang University
Mien - Ling Chen, Graduate Institute of Management Sciences Accounting Section Tamkang University
ABSTRACT. This study examines whether managers, given pressures from budget emphasis or role ambiguity, have a propensity to create slack, and how managers use different budgeting games to obtain desired budgets, and the impact on their attitudes towards the budget. The effects are tested using a structural equation model dealing with questionnaire data from 216 managers employed at listed companies in Taiwan. Analytical results indicate that managers with a higher budget emphasis will have a higher propensity to create budgetary slack, and are more likely to use economic games than devious games. Managers with higher role ambiguity will have higher propensity to create budgetary slack, and are more likely to use devious games and less likely to use economic games. Moreover, as hypothesized, managers using devious games are less likely to achieve their budgets than those using economic games.
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