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In the Public Interest: Why and How the Public Oversight Roles Differ Between the US General Accountability Office and the UK National Audit Office
Simon Norton,
Cardiff University
Murphy Smith, Texas A & M University
ABSTRACT. This paper examines and compares, according to the new public management (NPM) approach, the United States watchdog, the General Accountability Office (GAO), in its ability to oversee and call to account the Executive Branch and its United Kingdom counterpart, the National Audit Office (NAO). Results of this examination indicate that the GAO is more effective than its UK counterpart. The greater effectiveness of the GAO may be that it derives its powers and legitimacy from the existence of a written constitution; in contrast, in the UK there is no equivalent ‘sacrosanct’ document defining the relationship between the state and the citizenry. As a consequence the powers, duties, and self-perception of the NAO are significantly weaker and more mutable than those of the GAO.
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