|
The effect of cross listing on the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance
Bin Ke,
Pennsylvania State University
Oliver Rui, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Wei Yu, Chinese University of Hong Kong
ABSTRACT. Using a sample of mainland Chinese controlled firms listed on the stock exchanges of Hong Kong and mainland China, we assess how cross listing shares in a better investor protection country affects the managerial pay for performance sensitivity of cross listed firms. The managerial pay for performance sensitivity is defined in three ways: (a) the sensitivity of managerial annual cash compensation to firm performance, (b) the level of managerial equity ownership, and (c) the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. For non-state controlled firms, cross listed firms’ pay for performance sensitivity is stronger than that of non-cross listed firms and closer to that of comparable firms in the cross listing country. However, there is little evidence that cross listing improves the managerial pay for performance sensitivity for state controlled firms.
Full-Text is no longer available online. Please contact the author(s) for more information about this manuscript.
Back to Session Listing
|