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Management Accounting Section of the American Accounting Association

Journal of Management
Accounting Research

2000, Volume 12


Contents


Linking Balanced Scorecard Measures to Size and Market Factors: Impact on Organizational Performance

Zahirul Hoque
Griffith University-Gold Coast Campus

Wendy James
Griffith University-Gold Coast Campus

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between organization size, product life-cycle stage, market position, balanced scorecard (BSC) usage and organizational performance. Using financial and nonfinancial measures, the BSC appraises four dimensions of performance: customers, financial (or shareholders), learning and growth, and internal aspects. Based on a survey of 66 Australian manufacturing companies, the paper suggests that larger firms make more use of a BSC. In addition, firms that have a higher proportion of new products have a greater tendency to make use of measures related to new products. A firm's market position has not been found to be associated significantly with greater BSC usage. The paper also suggests that greater BSC usage is associated with improved performance, but this relationship does not depend significantly on organization size, product life cycle, or market position.

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A Review of the Effects of Financial Incentives on Performance in Laboratory Tasks: Implications for Management Accounting

Sarah E. Bonner
University of Southern California

Reid Hastie
University of Colorado at Boulder

Geoffrey B. Sprinkle
Indiana University

S. Mark Young
University of Southern California

Abstract: Management accounting information plays an important role in motivating individuals to improve performance (cf., Atkinson, Banker, Kaplan, and Young 1997). This role tends to be operationalized by linking compensation to performance, typically through the provision of financial incentives. Theoretically, financial incentives motivate people to exert additional effort, which in turn should improve task performance. However, a large body of empirical evidence indicates that financial incentive frequently do not lead to increased performance (e.g., Young and Lewis 1995; Jenkins et al. 1998). Consequently, it is important to examine variables that may interact with financial incentives in affecting task performance. This paper presents an extensive review of laboratory studies on financial incentives and examines the relations between type of task and type of incentive scheme, respectively, and task performance. We posit that performance in tasks of varying types (which we view as a surrogate for the gap between task complexity and skill) is differentially sensitive to the increases in effort induced by financial incentives and that not all incentive schemes elicit the same level of effort. Our review reveals that incentives improve performance in only about one half of the experiments. Further, as tasks become more cognitively complex, and thus as the average subject's skill level decreases, it is less likely that incentives improve performance. Finally, quota schemes have the highest likelihood of evincing positive incentive effects, followed by piece-rate schemes, tournament schemes, and fixed-rate schemes. Overall, our findings suggest that the type of task being performed and the type of incentive scheme being employed affect the efficacy of financial incentives and therefore may influence the design of management accounting and control systems.

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The Openness of Knowledge Sharing within Organizations: A Comparative Study of the United States and the People's Republic of China

Chee W. Chow
San Diego State University

F. Johnny Deng
Jinglun Electronic Co., Ltd.

Joanna L. Ho
University of California, Irvine

Abstract:This study examines empirically the interaction effects of national culture and contextual factors (nature of the knowledge and the relationship between the knowledge sharer and recipient) on employees' tendency to share knowledge with co-workers. Quantitative and open-ended responses to two scenarios were collected from 142 managers (104 from the U.S. and 38 from the People's Republic of China). These two nations were selected due to their divergence on salient aspects of national culture, as well as their global political and economic importance. The focus on interaction effects was aimed at providing a more powerful test of culture's effects than simple comparisons of means typical of prior related research.

Consistent with culture-based expectation, the quantitative results indicated that Chinese vs. U.S. nationals' openness of knowledge sharing was related to their different degrees of collectivism-the relative emphasis on self vs. collective interests-as well as whether knowledge sharing involved a conflict between self and collective interests. Also consistent with prediction, Chinese relative to U.S. nationals shared knowledge significantly less with a potential recipient who was not a member of their "ingroup." Content analysis of the open-ended responses further showed that the quantitative results are the aggregated outcomes of trade-offs across cultural attributes and their interactions with contextual factors.

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The Cost of System Congestion: Evidence from the Healthcare Sector

Ramji Balakrishnan
The University of Iowa

Naomi S. Soderstrom
University of Colorado at Boulder

Abstract: We investigate the cost of system congestion using data from 225,473 maternity admissions at 30 hospitals in the state of Washington. We identify congested days using the distribution of patient admissions for each hospital-year combination and use the rate of Caesarian section (C-sections) as the proxy for the cost of congestion. We use two separate logistic regressions to investigate the relation between congestion and the decision to operate. The first regression includes data from the full sample of patients. Contrary to expectations, we find that congestion does not increase C-section rates. We estimate the second regression using data only from those patients classified as being at risk for a C-section and find that congestion does lead to increased C-section rates. The difference obtains because our full sample analyses do not control for physician incentives to classify patients as being "at risk," and whether the patient is "at risk" is included as a control in the regression. The nature of our findings also suggests that the cost of congestion manifests itself in subtle ways, underscoring the importance of understanding the specifics of the process when we examine issues such as the cost of congestion.

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Second-Order Uncertainty in Accounting Information and Bilateral Bargaining Costs

Susan F. Haka
Michigan State University

Joan L. Luft
Michigan State University

Brian Ballou
Auburn University

Abstract: Bargaining costs have been identified as a key determinant of the organization of economic activity, and accounting information plays a significant role in contracts created through bargaining. Properties of accounting information systems can increase or decrease the uncertainty associated with accounting-based payoffs; we show in a bilateral bargaining setting that increased uncertainty leads to increased delays in reaching agreement and increased premiums for the party bearing the uncertainty. We examine two types of uncertainty: first-order (uncertainty about outcomes) and second-order (uncertainty about the probability distributions of outcomes). At a moderately high level of first-order uncertainty, we find that an accounting information system that lowers second-order uncertainty halves the time bargainers need to reach agreement and decreases the premium paid to the bargainer bearing increased risk by 43 percent. The fact that bargaining efficiency gains can arise from accounting systems that reduce second-order uncertainty can help explain the choices firms make in designing and operating their accounting information systems.

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