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Management Accounting Section of the American Accounting Association

Journal of Management
Accounting Research

2004, Volume 16


Contents

Forum on the Use of Stock and Stock Options in Employee Incentive Plans

Articles


Sink or Swim? Firms' Responses to Underwater Options

Sudhakar Balachandran
Mary Ellen Carter
Luann J. Lynch

Abstract:We examine changes in executive compensation that firms make in response to underwater options. Using a sample of firms with underwater options in 2000, we estimate that 81 percent of firms take action to respond to them. We examine explanations for the firms' responses. Opponents argue that it rewards poor performance and transfers wealth unjustifiably from shareholders to executives. We find some support for this argument in that firms with weaker governance structures are more likely to reprice underwater options. Alternatively, firms that respond claim they do so to restore incentives, retain executives, and insulate executives from market-wide or industry-wide factors beyond their control. Our results find evidence in support of these arguments in that restoring incentives and retaining executives seem to be the primary drivers of firms' responses.

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Pay-Performance Sensitivity in a Heterogeneous Managerial Labor Market

Hui Chen
Fei Leng

Abstract:The persistently low pay-performance sensitivity between executive compensation and firm performance has puzzled both practitioners and academics. We propose a hybrid model that incorporates both moral hazard and adverse selection problems to explain this puzzle. We argue that the managerial labor market is heterogeneous in nature, not homogeneous as assumed by the pure moral hazard model and empirical work based on this model. We demonstrate that the optimal pay-performance sensitivity derived from the hybrid model is lower than that derived from the pure moral hazard model. Furthermore, we also show that pay-performance sensitivity is a function of the mix of types in the market. The more capable managers there are in the market, the more likely the market's average pay-performance sensitivity is high. We then conduct an empirical test and find evidence that is consistent with the prediction of our model.

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Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms

Martin J. Conyon
Lerong He

Abstract:This study uses a sample of IPO firms to investigate the relation between the compensation committee, CEO compensation, and CEO incentives. We investigate two theoretical models: the three-tier optimal contracting model and the managerial power model. We find support for the three-tier agency model. The presence of significant shareholders on the compensation committee (i.e., those with share stakes in excess of 5 percent) is associated with lower CEO pay and higher CEO equity incentives. Firms with higher paid compensation committee members are associated with greater CEO compensation and lower incentives. The managerial power model receives little support. We find no evidence that insiders or CEOs of other firms serving on the compensation committee raise the level of CEO pay or lower CEO incentives.

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U.K. Executive Compensation Practices: New Economy versus Old Economy

Konstantinos Stathopoulos
Susanne Espenlaub
Martin Walker

Abstract:This paper examines the executive compensation practices of listed U.K. retailing companies. We compare "New Economy" retailers (e-commerce/dot-coms) to more traditional retailers operating in the "Old Economy." We also discriminate between recently floated retailers and their more seasoned counterparts. Using a sample of remuneration contracts for 549 directors in 72 listed U.K. companies in the New and Old Economies, we investigate the structure and level of executive (and nonexecutive) compensation defined as the sum of salary, annual bonus, and the values of executive stock options and long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). We investigate the extent to which the contract features are determined by firm characteristics, economic sector, and governance/ownership factors. In contrast to the U.S., where almost all executive stock options are issued at the money, there is a greater variety of practice in the U.K. with some options being granted substantially in the money. We therefore pay special attention to this U.K. institutional feature by producing a model designed to explain the cross-sectional variation in the moneyness of stock options at the date of issue. We also examine the determinants of a number of other contract features. These are: the time to maturity of the executive stock options, the leverage of the compensation package, the ratio of long-term pay relative to short-term pay, and pay performance sensitivity. We find that differences in compensation arrangements can be explained to a significant extent by differences in firm size, growth/growth opportunities, firm financial policy, ownership characteristics, and governance arrangements. We also find some systematic differences between the compensation arrangements of CEOs and other executives.

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Aggregation and Measurement Errors in Performance Evaluation

Anil Arya
John C. Fellingham
Douglas A. Schroeder

Abstract:In this paper, we present a sequential production setting wherein employing aggregate measures for performance evaluation prove superior to those constructed specifically to measure individual activity. In our setting, unverifiable inputs translate into verifiable measures via two types of shocks: the first is production errors that cause outputs to deviate from inputs, and the second is measurement errors that result in outputs themselves being stated imprecisely. Agents are evaluated using either individual or aggregate measures, where the former measures the incremental output added by each link and the latter measures the cumulative output produced at the end of each stage. Aggregate measures can be preferred to individual measures because they increase the sample size available to infer upstream agents' unobservable acts and because they serve as an avenue for measurement errors to cancel.

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Managing Value Creation within the Firm: An Examination of Multiple Performance Measures

Lisa Bryant
Denise A. Jones
Sally K. Widener

Abstract: There has been an emphasis in recent years on understanding how value is created within the firm. To understand what drives value, managers must have in place performance measurement systems designed to capture information on all aspects of the business, not just the financial results. Many firms are implementing a Balanced Scorecard (BSC) performance measurement system that tracks measures across four hierarchical perspectives: learning and growth, internal business processes, customer, and financial perspectives. Although BSCs should ideally be tailored to each firm's unique strategy, evidence shows that managers tend to rely on generic measures, particularly as measures of the outcome of each perspective. We use cross-sectional data on seven archival measures from 125 firms over a five-year period to proxy for typical outcome measures of the four BSC perspectives. We find that a model that allows each outcome measure to be associated with outcome measures in all higher-level BSC perspectives captures the value-creation process better than a relatively simple model that allows each measure to be a driver of only the next perspective in the BSC hierarchy. We also find differences in the relations among performance measures when firms implement a performance measurement system that contains both financial and nonfinancial measures versus one that relies solely on financial measures.

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The Value of Activity-Based Costing in Competitive Pricing Decisions

Eddy Cardinaels
Filip Roodhooft
Luk Warlop

Abstract: This paper reports experimental evidence on the merits of activity-based costing (ABC) for price-setting in competitive markets that differ in their ability to provide informative feedback. Earlier research has shown that informative market feedback dominates the effects of cost-system design. In a multimarket context involving cost allocations, the present results suggest that cost-system refinement can play a significant role in price-setting, even in the presence of informative market feedback. Specifically, ABC provides benefits over volume-based costing in market segments in which biased cost allocations produce accounting losses that hinder learning from superior competitors. Compared to these informative settings, additional evidence also shows that performance is negatively affected by less informative market feedback. Yet in less informative settings, ABC still outperforms traditional costing, presumably because it helps to filter irrelevant competitor feedback from the decision process.

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Lessons Lost in Linearity: A Critical Assessment of the General Usefulness of LEN Models in Compensation Research

Thomas Hemmer

Abstract: As the Linear-Exponential-Normal (LEN) Principal-Agent model has gained in popularity, it has also increasingly been applied to problems inherently inconsistent with the assumptions underpinning this fragile framework. Concerns regarding LEN analysis in such cases are generally countered by appealing to the results' intuitive nature. When consistent with economic intuition, it is argued, the constraints the LEN framework imposes on such problems are likely non-consequential. This paper demonstrates in two simple cases that even seemingly intuitive results of non-optimal LEN analysis can be fundamentally different from the results that obtain from analysis of the unrestricted programs. Accordingly the paper makes a case for limiting LEN-type analysis to settings that are actually compatible with this framework.

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Does Managerial Accounting Research Contribute to Related Disciplines? An Examination Using Citation Analysis

Yaw M. Mensah
Nen-Chen Richard Hwang
Donghui Wu

Abstract:This paper examines two issues. The first issue is the degree of relative isolation of managerial accounting research (MAR) from related disciplines. Using citations collected from the Web of Science, the study shows that MAR published during 1986-2000 in the four leading accounting journals is cited in journals in fields as diverse as economics, operations research, psychology, sociology, organizational behavior, and strategic management. Our findings support Kinney's (2001) observation that accounting researchers have a competitive advantage in areas relating to alternative business measurement structures.

The second issue the paper addresses is whether economics-based MAR papers make a greater contribution than papers based on other disciplines, as perceived from their respective citation rates. Our citation analysis finds no evidence that economics-based papers are cited by non-accounting researchers at a higher rate than MAR based on other disciplines. Extending the comparison to accounting journals covered in the Web of Science did not change this conclusion. We interpret this as a refutation of the contention by Zimmerman (2001) that economics-based MAR papers are more likely to make significant contributions to knowledge.

We also report some preliminary evidence that the relevance of MAR to researchers publishing in non-accounting journals is waning. Although this finding is tentative, it may be an early warning signal that should be monitored in future research.

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Determinants of Customer Loyalty and Financial Performance

E. Smith
William F. Wright

Abstract: Recent research in accounting advocates nonfinancial measures of company performance, such as customer satisfaction and loyalty, as useful indicators of aspects of firm performance. But what are the drivers of customer satisfaction and loyalty? We provide an integrated causal model of company performance in the personal computer (PC) industry that simultaneously tests links between product value attributes resulting from business process performance, customer loyalty, and financial outcomes. Our results extend prior accounting research (e.g., Banker et al. 2000; Ittner and Larcker 1998) in two directions: (1) by explaining the determinants of customer loyalty, and (2) by clarifying the relation between customer loyalty and measures of financial performance. We report that product value attributes directly and differentially impact levels of customer loyalty as well as prevailing average selling prices. Furthermore, measures of customer loyalty explain levels of relative revenue growth and profitability, and relatively high customer loyalty engenders a competitive advantage in the PC industry.

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Management Accounting: Some Comments

Charles T. Horngren

When I received the AAA Lifetime Contribution to Management Accounting Award, I was asked to talk for a few minutes. This paper contains those remarks plus some additions. Former articles have reflected on the changes in management accounting throughout my long university teaching career (Williams 1986; Horngren 1989, 1995). Moreover, some personal descriptions of my experiences are available (Horngren 1993). Therefore, this paper will not repeat those expositions of history. Instead, I will concentrate on a few core ideas.

As always, all of us are heavily influenced by our readings and our discussions with co-workers. This paper is a personal statement, but I claim no originality. Many writers, colleagues, students, and managers have affected my thoughts.t restoring incentives and retaining executives seem to be the primary drivers of firms' responses.

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